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REDISTRICTING EFFECT IN A NONPARTISAN WORLD: 
TOWARD A THEORY OF REAPPORTIONMENT AT THE COUNTY BOARD 
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT 
Amy Uden 
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Abstract: Electoral redistricting shapes political scientists' perceptions of partisan polarization and 
incumbency. This paper examines the redistricting process at the county level of government, using the 
cases of McLean and Champaign Counties, Illinois. This research analyzes the McLean County board's 
voting cleavages in order to highlight considerations of nonpartisan electoral bodies. With Champaign 
County as a comparison, it also uses a series of linear regression models to analyze redistricting's effects 
on county incumbency and board composition. Redistricting impact proved insignificant, but the study 
demonstrates correlations between county electoral composition and state-level electoral trends, and also 
confirms the important influence of partisanship on redistricting and electoral outcomes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In February of 2007, the McLean County Board voted to take a stance regarding a legal 
ban of smoking indoors in Illinois, with eleven out of nineteen members voting against a board 
declaration of support for the ban. At a time when the issue was a contested topic at the state 
level of government, the board members, though not capable of directly impacting the state 
legislation's outcome, felt compelled to declare a position. Ideological and personal 
considerations undoubtedly played into this vote, which did not split cleanly along party lines, 
although the issue had partisan overtones at the state leveL Significantly, such votes often occur 
on the McLean County Board, in spite of its reputation as a nonpartisan body. At other 
instances in the board's history, members have chosen to take similar stances on everything 
from video gaming to terrorism. For an ostensibly nonpartisan body, this behavior raises 
questions of a more nuanced background story of board interaction. 
County governments receive very little attention from political scientists, and have been 
famously acknowledged to be the /I dark continent of political science,"l although perhaps they 
deserve more attention than they generally stimulate. Political scientists often perceive county 
government as insignificant because of characteristics such as local specificity and 
nonpartisanship. Yet why, in a body with allegedly little partisan influence, would board 
members feel the need to act in such an ideologically driven fashion? Issue positions like those 
taken on the smoking ban could be harmful to board cohesion and personal interaction, and 
could also risk alienating state-level legislators whose work controls county intergovernmental 
constraints. Under these circumstances, the risks of the situation seem high compared to the 
psychological pay-off involved. This anecdote highlights just one instance of interest within 
county politics, suggesting the merit of further study in this area. 
This study will examine one of the most highly contested issues in political science 
within the unusual framework of a county government-that of electoral redistricting. This 
research will use cases from central Illinois for an exploratory look at a largely ignored subject. 
1 Gilbertson 1917. 
60 RES PUBLICA 
Reapportionment problems touch many aspects of political science, from incumbency to 
partisanship. In this exploratory study, the role of partisanship in McLean County Board voting 
is examined, as well as the applicability of redistricting theory to county government. A 
comparison of McLean County, a body with a reputation for little partisanship, to Champaign 
County, a more competitive body, as well as to other findings in the field, could provide a 
springboard for further research on the role of these political issues in all levels of government. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is little doubt that electoral redistricting is a hotly contested issue at federal, state, 
and local levels of government. Incumbency advantage, district competitiveness, and partisan 
competition constitute some of the concerns expressed by scholars and politicians with respect 
to redistricting. For purposes of this county government research, the most directly relevant 
issues are those of partisan competitiveness. Generally, scholars agree that the institutional 
arrangements for redistricting do impact partisan competitiveness.2 Partisan and bipartisan 
plans pursue different ends, and deal with the often-competing interests of the party 
organization and individual incumbents. No definitive answers exist for these questions of seat 
efficiency and polarization. While some perceive redistricting as beneficial to democratic 
representativeness and responsiveness, others find that its impact is limited or diminishes over 
time.3 Overall, the exhaustive redistricting literature emphasizes the importance of partisan 
competition in the reapportionment process, and the redistricting process's well-studied nature 
at the national and state levels far eclipses its examination within the context of counties .  
Addressing the situation of county-level redistricting also implies examining urban­
rural representation, bringing nonpartisan voting effects to the forefront. Regional voting 
patterns tend to be insignificant alongside partisan splits, unless they are somehow 
institutionally reinforced.4 Even if a split based on non-partisan characteristics exists for a 
legislative body, its impact is less likely to hold up over time without the backing of some 
structural trait of the body, such as its electoral districts. At this point, McLean County's 
historically limited competitiveness becomes relevant to the discussion. Partisan 
competitiveness sparks interest most often when a formerly weak party becomes stronger, 
which seems to be the case in McLean County at this time, as two-party competition has only 
recently developed. For instance, in the case of post-war Southern realignment, as migration or 
social changes caused the growth of the Republican Party, the shift was aided by congressional 
redistricting, and incumbents had to adjust representation accordingly.5 Southern realignment 
could provide a comparative example for the perceived strengthening of partisan 
competitiveness in McLean County. This case's progression of social change and gradual 
2 Mann and Cain, eds. 2005; Gelman and King 1994; Jewell 1955. 
3 Cain 1985; Squire 1998; Gilligan and Matsuska 1999. 
4 Robeck 1970; Broach 1972. 
5 Polsby 2004; Sundquist 1983; Shafer and Johnson 2006; Basinger and Ensley 2007. 
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electoral change can provide a springboard story for future research on county 
reapportionment. 
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When measuring partisan competition, scholars look to the attitudes of both candidates 
and voters within elections.6 In state legislatures, parties both provide a default cleavage 
structure and help with institutional and ideological organization.7 While that approach 
examines electoral impact of partisan competitiveness, party formation and competitiveness 
may apply differently at the local level where legislative indicators are not fully developed. 
When applying this to county or local party context, past research often stresses both the 
importance of a "trickle-up effect" of party, and points out that although variations exist in 
county-level party organizations, even without a clear chain of command, local parties 
undergird electoral process.8 
However, little of the existing research deals with the shape and make-up of partisan 
competitiveness within county government. While Beck discusses county demographics in 
relation to party, even his work does not explicitly examine county governments.9 This provides 
another basis for comparing the constituent make-up and partisan competitiveness of counties. 
Although party organization may not be directly tied to the redistricting process in the county, 
the connections between these fields of study suggest that vibrant partisan competitiveness has 
significant implications in the electoral redistricting process. As more intense competitiveness 
arises, the level of partisanship in redistricting will also likely rise. MacManus extends these 
studies with a compilation of county make-up survey responses dealing explicitly with board 
elections and partisanship. Although she notes a trend toward increased competition reported 
in board elections, she also suggests at several points that the effects of term structures and 
other generally influential institutional electoral arrangements have received no empirical 
testing at this levepo 
Intertwining these several different bodies of scholarship will add to the scholarly 
conversation by linking these fields to the " dark continent." The county can provide a venue 
through which to examine the variance of electoral competition and party development in a 
different ideological environment. The states have often been dubbed "laboratories of 
democracy" by political scientists, and by similar logic, local governments can bring 
experimentation to new levels and throw structure of government into even sharper relief.11 
While reviewing the scholarship on redistricting, Theodore Arrington discusses the multiplicity 
of issues touched by redistricting questions, including party, race, representativeness, local 
boundaries, and decision making in the face of competing criteria.12 Less weighed down in 
bureaucratic and federal limitations, local governments can be uniquely situated to embrace 
6 Basinger and Ensley 2007. 
7 Wright and Schaffner 2002. 
8 Frendreis et al. 1990; Dyck, et al. 2009; Eldersveld and Walton 2000. 
9 Beck 1974. 
10 MacManus 1996. 
11 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann 1932. 
12 Arrington 2010. 
62 RES PUBLICA 
future redistricting questions by implementing different plans and experimenting with new 
technologies. Connecting local partisan competition to redistricting politics, along with 
applying these principles to the county level of government in both McLean and Champaign 
counties, may provide new perspective to our knowledge of electoral redistricting and 
partisanship. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
The use of theoretical approaches that examine incumbency and partisan advantage in 
conjunction with redistricting has been supported by a wealth of empirical evidence, 
particularly at the national level. Most research distinguishes between partisan, bipartisan, and 
nonpartisan redistricting processes)3 County governments experience electoral 
reapportionment in a similar manner to those at state and national levels of government, yet 
application of redistricting theory to counties has seldom occurred. Conversely, normative 
theory suggests that, particularly when we emphasize democratic representation, local 
governments provide for citizen-government interaction in unique and more direct ways. 
Moreover, local context can also indirectly play a significant role at high levels of government, 
due to mixed influences such as perceived competition, ideological similarity, and complacency 
effects.14 In addition to partisan representation, constituent-based representation, such as 
urban-rural interest splits, can play an important role at this level, though perhaps only if 
institutionally reinforced in the county legislative body.ls Therefore, applying redistricting 
theory to county governments has potential normative significance. The approach here will be, 
to the greatest extent possible, to apply the theoretical frameworks surrounding redistricting to 
the county level of government in an exploratory type of study. 
Based on this foundation, redistricting will be examined through the implications of 
partisan competitiveness, or lack thereof, in the county environment. McLean County is 
historically a one-party Republican county, but has experienced a strong trend toward 
increased two-part competition over the last generation. Historically, the political divisions in 
the county were more likely to be urban-rural than Democratic-Republican. McLean County's 
urban-rural divisions are also somewhat similar to the up-state versus down-state split of 
Illinois at large. As the county has become more competitive, the county board's "nonpartisan" 
reputation has increasingly been called into question. This does not, however, indicate that 
Democratic considerations have replaced urban ones on the McLean County Board, because 
party lines have not necessarily coincided cleanly with urban and rural areas thus far. 
This research also examines Champaign County as a useful electoral comparison and 
control. Champaign County and McLean County are similar in size and close in proximity. 16 
13 Gelman and King 1994. 
14 Dyck 2009. 
15 Broach 1972. 
16 According to the u.s. Census Bureau's 2009 estimates, Champaign County's population is 195,671, and 
McLean County's population is 167,699. 
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Both counties have twin-cities at their center, with influential universities, high mobility, and 
parallel urban-rural divisions. The county board structures of the two also have similar features, 
with relatively large elected bodies and staggered terms. Despite these similarities, Champaign 
County has a reputation for being a much more partisan. An examination of the voting margins 
for election to the Champaign County Board as compared to those of McLean County provides 
empirical evidence supporting this claim (See Figure 1 below) . Since questions of partisanship 
play so heavily into redistricting, these two cases supply a controlled comparison of the state of 
partisanship within counties. 
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Figure 1: McLean and Champaign Counties' County Board 
Average Margins of Victory, 1980-2009 
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Since partisan composition of electoral districts plays such a vital role in the redistricting 
process, the existence or lack of existence of partisan competitiveness in the county has key 
significance. This solidifies the rationale for examining partisan competitiveness in conjunction 
with electoral redistricting in McLean County and other counties. Furthermore, the increasing 
population of McLean County, fueled by migration to the twin cities of Bloomington-Normal 
may be intensifying two-party competition. It may also be producing higher levels of 
partisanship in its elected legislative body. Empirical confirmation for these trends would assist 
in applying the standard theories of redistricting to the county level of government. If this is the 
case, partisanship could be expected to be the most salient in the politics of redistricting. The 
hypotheses will therefore include the following: 
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HI: As partisan competition in the county electorate increases, partisan decision-making in the 
county board also increases. 
H2: As the role of partisan competitiveness in the county board increases, standard electoral 
trends accompanying redistricting will also become more evident in the county. 
These hypotheses focus primarily on the existence of, or increased growth of, partisan 
competitiveness. This phenomenon is not always active at the county level, but plays a strong 
role in determining redistricting plans' outcomes and effects. Because of the role of 
competitiveness in redistricting theory, its place in McLean County must be established. The 
questions concerning redistricting theory are contingent upon this first descriptive aspect of 
research concerning the nature of county representation, so only after uncovering this 
relationship should the other hypothesis be pursued. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 1 
This study uses a number of basic linear regressions to test its theoretical framework. A 
very limited level of compiled data exists at the county level of government, so measures had to 
be created. For the first hypothesis, the model aims to discover the impact of partisan 
competitiveness in the county electorate as a whole on county board decision-making 
considerations or cleavages. Board decision-making splits will be measured based on a 
comparative group cohesion score, defined as the average percentage of each groups' cohesion 
over the percentage of average total board cohesion.17 These cohesion scores were based on 
aggregated roll call voting patterns for pairings of individual members across time. Roll call 
votes are a standard measure of legislator behavior. Although increasingly less common in 
recent years for the McLean County Board, roll call voting occurs at the county level for 
controversial or procedurally significant votes. These votes can potentially explain members' 
17 To construct these cohesion scores, individual board members' roll call voting histories were initially 
established. Then, pairs of individual members were matched up to create member to member cohesion 
scores for each pair of members on the board. Cohesion can be described as the number of votes together 
out of the total number of votes on which both member voted. Once these scores were compiled, group 
averages were calculated, i.e. Republicans voting with Republicans, Democrats voting with Democrats, 
and so on. Again, because some board members did not vote in every roll call, either due to absence from 
meeting, abstention, appointment to the board mid-year, or (in the case of the chair) procedure, the 
cohesion scores for each pair of members come from the percentage of votes " together" out of votes in 
which both members voted. Unanimous votes always remain within the set, because although they 
elevate the scores slightly, members did have opportunity to vote non-unanimously and chose not to do 
so. In the case of some members who voted only on one or two votes in the course of the year, their scores 
were outliers that skewed the average. Accordingly, if an individual member votes on less than one third 
of the roll call votes, their percentages do not make up a part of the board average scores. One third of the 
votes functioned as the threshold because it minimized the number of cases that would be removed while 
still accounting for the problem of outliers. However, in order not to haphazardly remove nuance from 
the voting patterns, this rule only took effect in situations for which theoretical justification existed, such 
as in the case of board chairpersons or members with partial-year terms. 
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actions based on their ideological framework better than any other measure. Using this measure 
of the comparative frequency with which members of different groups on the board vote 
together will serve as a proxy measure for how important the different considerations of party 
and regional interest are to board decision-making. If board members vote together by group 
substantially differently from how they vote as an overall body, movement across time or in 
comparison to county electorate trends may be revealing about partisan competitiveness and its 
role in the board as a legislative body. 
Independent variables in the model include the state of Illinois' presidential and 
gubernatorial margins (Republican vote minus Democratic vote), McLean County presidential 
and gubernatorial models, the change in composition of the county board in the previous 
election year, the number of uncontested seats in the previous election year for each party, and 
the number of incumbents reelected in the election of the year before the cohesion scores. Each 
of these variables demonstrates the strength of partisan competition in the electorate, as 
opposed to the existence of an electorate not dominated by only one party or ideological 
framework. Furthermore, since this study also attempts to uncover the impact of redistricting 
on county boards, it controls for redistricting with a variable indicating the number of years 
since the last redistricting process. 
The model examines the McLean County Board's roll call voting back to 1982, the year 
when the current County Board ten-district structure came into place. Within the data set, each 
case covers a two-year time span, including election data from only election years and board 
decision-making data from the election year and the following year. This time lag provides a 
built-in attempt to gauge the effects of competition in the county at large, measured through 
various election results, on the board's decision-making cleavages. Using the two-year span as 
the unit of analysis presumably meshes the actual outcome of the various elections with county 
board actions. Previous studies on electoral redistricting also examine the impact of redistricting 
on incumbent security and partisan composition over an extended period of time, strengthening 
the rationale for using two-year intervals as opposed to the one-year intervals common in roll 
call analyses.18 
In terms of other measures, the presidential and gubernatorial votes measure the 
strength of partisan competition in the county as compared to a control of the state for macro­
level trends. State-level data serve as the control because factors that impact McLean County 
will presumably be more likely to parallel those of impacting Illinois more closely than those at 
the national level. Including a variable representing the strength of local parties, such as those 
from each party who filed to be precinct committeemen, may also have been beneficial, but the 
data for this component were not available. 
Changes in board composition also play a large theoretical role in explaining the 
variance in the dependent variable. This research tracks board composition as it changes in 
election years by measuring the number of Democrats elected out of the total number of 
18 Gelman and King 1994. 
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available seats, including those for unexpired terms that were up for election. Especially in the 
case of McLean County, increasing Democratic presence on the board would suggest a more 
competitive body, in a fashion that may parallel the growth of Democratic competition in the 
county over time. The number of uncontested seats from each party could work in opposite 
directions, as Republican uncontested seats would indicate less competition, but Democratic 
uncontested seats may mean the opposite in a generally Republican county context. The 
average margin of victory for McLean County Board seats serves as a final indicator of 
competition. To measure this margin, Republican percentage of the two-party vote is used. The 
average of each Republican candidate's strength across all of the districts shows the electoral 
strength, and therefore measures change the same way as the mathematical margin. Greater 
margins of victory indicate a less competitive county, and in the model, should be negatively 
related to the expected outcome of movement in cohesion scores based on increased party 
competitiveness.19 The controls for incumbent reelection and redistricting also attempt to 
incorporate redistricting theory, by taking into account the potential for the board to have its 
partisan composition influenced by these factors. 
As explained above, the models separate the board into Republican, Democratic, rural, 
and urban groups, in order to uncover the strength of each of these cleavages as considerations 
for board decision-making. More fit in a model indicates that board group cohesion moves in 
relation to changes in county partisanship. In other words, increased group cohesion suggests 
possible increased prevalence of group association in members' decision-making. The model 
tests whether or not movement in board group considerations occur based on the impact of 
increased partisanship within the county electorate. Significant results indicate that a group on 
the board votes more cohesively with increase of county partisanship. Practically speaking, the 
shape of McLean County's efforts to redistrict in 2011 may be determined by whether or not 
urban-rural considerations remain consistent. Therefore, in order to explain which group votes 
together most strongly in conjunction with the level of partisan competition in the county, the 
model has been run with each group's cohesion scores individually serving as dependent 
variables. Results of each model appear as follows: 
19 In 1998 for McLean County, and in 2002 for Champaign County, incomplete election records left out 
some of the districts. Accordingly, a margin that averages the preceding and following years' election 
margins has been created as a substitute measure, in order to preserve all possible cases. 
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Table 1: Models of McLean County Partisan Competitiveness and 
Average Board Roll Call Vote Cohesion, by Group, 1982-2009 
67 
Dependent Variable: McLean County Board Average Group Cohesion Compared to Average Total Cohesion 
( . h . d h . . 'bl . d 1 f . b '  d 
. .  ki) WIt mcrease group co eSlOn suggestmg POSSI e mcrease . preva ence 0 group assocIation m mem ers eCIslOn-ma ng) 
Independent Variable Republican Cohesion Democratic Cohesion Rural Cohesion Urban Cohesion 
Constant 62.430 4.165 -149.789 137.214 
(47.428) (204.299) (266.206) (86.509) 
State Presidential Margin -.614 1.323 -1.030 5.830 
(.903) (3.889) (5.075) (1.647) 
State Gubernatorial -2.892** 2.410 .220 -.780 
Margin (.186) (.800) (1.045) (.339) 
McLean Presidential 1.092 -1.587 .938 -5.426 
Margin (.805) (3.467) (4.524) (1.468) 
McLean Gubernatorial 3.057** -2.939 -.285 -.429 
Margin (.243) (1.048) (1.368) (.444) 
Board Composition -1.215** .960 .365 -1.175 
(Percent Democrats (.214) (.921) (1.202) (.390) 
Elected) 
McLean Uncontested .339 -.322 -.796 -.638 
Races-Republican (.145) (.625) (.816) (.265) 
McLean Uncontested -.138 .315 .554 .338 
Races- Democratic (.226) (.972) (1.268) (.412) 
McLean County Board -1.132* .342 .753 -1.253 
Average Margin (.334) (1.437) (1.875) (.608) 
(Rep. Vote) 
McLean Incumbents -.189 -.043 .551 -.202 
Reelected (.062) (.269) (.351) (.114) 
Redistricting Year -.287 .278 .388 .088 
(1.218) (5.246) (3.589) (2.221) 
N 14 14 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .751 .030 -.942 -.589 
F-Test 4.917 1.040 .369 .518 
Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p �.1, ** P �.05, ***p �.01 
Table 1 presents the results for each of these models, although none are statistically 
significant overall. Interestingly, the model explains the most for Republican group cohesion 
and the least for rural group cohesion. By this logic, rural-urban splits on the board could be 
influenced least by changes in the partisan composition of the county. While this may suggest 
that these considerations vary less over time in board decision-making, it also may suggest that 
urban-rural groupings' importance to the board simply moves inconsistently as compared with 
county partisanship. On the other hand, the random variance in cohesion scores based on 
member personality, along with the limited number of cases, could be interfering with or 
diminishing the effects of any discernible trend. Within the models, some of the variable's 
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correlations are significant, but the findings are mixed in terms of their movement in the 
direction anticipated. The number of cases limits possibility for significance in these models, as 
well as others throughout the study. However, this limited "N" comes from the fact that the 
current board structure did not come into place until 1982, so cases before this time would cause 
internal inconsistency within the model. 
The model for Republican group cohesion on the board had the greatest explanatory 
power. When the average margin of victory for board seats increased, meaning that 
Republicans were more secure, they voted together less frequently. This suggests that 
insecurity, or increased competitiveness, would impact board decision-making along partisan 
lines. The significance of this model of increased county competitiveness on Republican voting 
cohesion suggests that party may be becoming more important to board process. On the other 
hand, as the board becomes more Democratic (Board Composition Change), Republican 
cohesion also decreases. Bivariate correlations between the various indicators of partisan 
competition and board cohesion measures also present mixed findings. In most cases, cohesion 
scores across years waver around a central score, but do not trend in any particular direction. 
This creates difficulty in identifying the overall strength of voting cleavages on the board, and 
distinguishing partisan or urban-rural considerations from those of particular members' voting 
habits and personalities. In McLean County's specific case of redistricting, to rule out 
institutionally reinforcing urban and rural considerations in the board decision-making process 
may at this point be empirically unsupported. 
To clarify some of these models' mixed findings the bivariate relationships between 
Board Composition Change, Average Margin of Republican Victory, and each of the cohesion 
scores were examined. Interestingly, the only correlation that achieved significance, aside from 
those measuring similar phenomena, was that of Democratic Cohesion and Board Composition 
Change. Since Board Composition Change measures the increase in the percentage of 
Democrats elected to the board, the expected positive correlation (.458*) occurred. For this 
correlation only to achieve significance among the other measures suggests that Democrats, as 
the smallest group on the board, tend to experience the effects of partisan competition the most. 
Accordingly, their voting patterns on the board, including their relative tendency to vote 
together as a group, move significantly with their strength in the board composition. This 
finding has interesting implications for board voting patterns if the board's composition 
continues to become more competitive, as predicted. 
A graphical representation of two of these group cohesion measures, Republican and 
rural, as compared to McLean County's presidential vote margin, displays some of the 
ambiguity surrounding groups' cohesion scores. Depicted visually below in Figure I, contrary 
to the hypothesis, rural voting patterns have stayed equally cohesive and even discernibly 
increased as partisan competition has increased (shown in terms of a decreasing Republican 
margin of victory over time). Republican voting cohesion, on the other hand, seems to neither 
trend upward nor downward over time, though it may be in the process of increasing slightly. 
In spite of statistical insignificance, this trend, at least in McLean County up to the present, 
would seem to indicate that partisan decision-making on the board has not necessarily become 
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a more salient cleavage even as the partisan competition of the board changes. These findings 
emphasize the benefit of maintaining the urban-rural split in McLean County's board, and the 
type of decisions faced by board members, concerning issues like zoning, may support this 
emphasis. 
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Figure 1: Republican and Rural Board Members' Average Cohesion and 
McLean County Presidential Voting Margins, 1982-2009 
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Significance issues for all of the data supporting this hypothesis again make it difficult to 
draw substantive conclusions. Perhaps, however, this reinforces a different aspect of local 
government and partisanship. Because of its face-to-face nature, partisan competitiveness may 
have a less overt impact on county government. Alternatively, these measures may not be the 
best depiction of the interactions that take place within county government. For instance, more 
qualitative or content-based analysis could better represent the influence of different voting 
considerations on the county board. 
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EMPIRICAL MODELS AND FINDINGS: HYPOTHESIS 2 
This study has also hypothesized that in counties with greater partisan competitiveness, 
electoral redistricting has a greater impact on county board composition. This model utilizes 
variables similar to those that made up the independent variable set in the previous modeL This 
portion of the studies deals with the effects of redistricting on various measures of board 
security and incumbent advantage. Table 2 presents the data from Champaign County, an 
adjacent jurisdiction with a history of much higher partisan competition. 
The first regression uses as its dependent variable the composition of the counties' 
respective boards, measured in terms of percent of Democrats elected. While this variable does 
not measure total board composition because it accounts only for those elected in each election 
cycle and county board members have staggered terms, its change from year to year captures 
the shape of change in board composition. By looking at this measure first, one can gauge 
whether or not redistricting has any influence on board composition at the county leveL 
The model's independent variables consist of multiple controls, including state and 
county presidential and gubernatorial margins of victory. Controlling for the overall change in 
the political or partisan forces impacting the county will allow for any effects of redistricting to 
be distinguished from the general pattern of board composition change that might have 
occurred even without redistricting. In this model, the logic of including uncontested races has 
shifted slightly from that in the first model of this study. Here, uncontested races contribute a 
general control for the tone of the board in terms of its normal trend of competition, and 
accounts for local electoral patterns in specific districts. The percentage of incumbents reelected 
also serves as a control in this situation. Incumbency advantage and redistricting effects are 
often tied to one another in the literature. Yet if the counties experience robust incumbency 
advantage effects from year to year, their impact would skew the perception of redistricting 
effects, and for this reason, incumbency also serves as an independent variable. 
Finally, the redistricting variable should, according to the hypothesis, influence the 
board composition. As the years since a redistricting process occurs lapse, the redistricting's 
effects on board elections should decline. The table below presents the results of this model for 
both Champaign County and McLean County: 
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Table 2: County Board Redistricting and Board Composition Measure, 1982-2009 
Dependent Variable: Board Composition (Percent Democrats Elected) 
Champaign County McLean County 
Independent Variable Independent Variable 
Constant -37.730 Constant 83.406 
(41.370) (102.756) 
State Presidential 1.192 State Presidential .740 
Margin (1.005) Margin (2.094) 
State Gubernatorial 1.021 State Gubernatorial -.344 
Margin (.185) Margin (.430) 
Champaign Presidential -.634 McLean Presidential -.530 
Margin (.998) Margin (1.872) 
Champaign -2.107* McLean Gubernatorial -.057 
Gubernatorial Margin (.366 Margin (.569) 
Champaign Uncontested -1.224* McLean Uncontested -.587 
Races-Republican (.550) Races-Republican (.308) 
Champaign Uncontested 2.033** McLean Uncontested .460 
Races- Democratic (.881) Races- Democratic (.474) 
Champaign County -1.190 McLean County Board -.423 
Board Average Margin (.824) Average Margin (.730) 
(Rep. Vote) (Rep. Vote) 
Champaign Incumbents .435 McLean Incumbents -.102 
Reelected (.156) Reelected (.144) 
Redistricting Year .609* Redistricting Year .341 
(1.802) (2.633) 
N 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .744 .291 
F-Test 5.192* 1.591 
Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** p ::;.05, ***p ::;.01 
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In this model, a positive relationship exists between the lapse in years after redistricting 
and change in board composition, although it is only significant for Champaign County. One 
feasible explanation hinges on the Republican strength. As more time passes from the 
redistricting more Democrats are elected, so perhaps redistricting favors board Republicans. Yet 
another possibility is that the relationship between these two variables does not capture 
redistricting effects within the right time span or type of measurement. Especially in 
Champaign County, where the board is more competitive and composition may be more stable, 
a simple measure of board composition change may not reveal the full story of redistricting 
effects. Again, the problem of a small sample size surfaces as well, since various races' 
individual characteristics may impact board composition more, especially at the county level. 
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Because of the ambiguity accompanying an exploratory study such as this, it was 
necessary to measure redistricting effects in terms of other dependent variables as well. Board 
Composition may only suggest one part of the total impact redistricting has on a county board. 
The next model examines the effect of redistricting on incumbent reelection rate. If county 
government parallels other governmental bodies, redistricting may be used to make incumbents 
safer. Therefore, using incumbent reelection rates as a measure of the impact of redistricting on 
the nature of the county board ultimately meshes with the logic of the question. The 
construction of the incumbency dependent variable was similar to that used in other studies, 
and consists of a percentage of incumbents reelected out of the total number of seats up for 
reelection. In some instances, this may not account for the fact that incumbents chose not to run 
for reelection. However, eliminating these instances from the possible pool of seats up for 
election may remove some of the data's descriptive power because the fact that incumbents 
chose not to run for one reason or another could also be an effect of redistricting. Therefore, 
retaining the total number of possible seats in which incumbents could have run and won for 
the basis of comparison in the variable contributes to its theoretical power to explain. With the 
logic of this variable set forth, the findings of the impact of redistricting on incumbent reelection 
rates for McLean and Champaign Counties are listed in Table 3 below: 
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Table 3: County Board Redistricting and Board Member Security Measures, 1982-2009 
Dependent Variable: Incumbent Reelection Rate 
Champaign County McLean County 
Independent Variable Independent Variable 
Constant 77.936 Constant 147.788 
(110.366) (372.386) 
State Presidential -1.657 State Presidential .000 
Margin (2.578) Margin (7.227) 
State Gubernatorial -1.224 State Gubernatorial -.940 
Margin (.534) Margin (1.445) 
Champaign Presidential 1.173 McLean Presidential .126 
Margin (2.487) Margin (6.442) 
Champaign 2.659* McLean Gubernatorial .586 
Gubernatorial Margin (1.056) Margin (1.931) 
Champaign Uncontested 1.289 Mclean Uncontested .744 
Races-Republican (1.884) Races-Republican (1.096) 
Champaign Uncontested -1.948 McLean Uncontested .077 
Races- Democratic (3.848) Races- Democratic (1.804) 
Champaign County -1.041 McLean County Board -.548 
Board Average Margin (2.595) Average Margin (2.560) 
(Rep. Vote) (Rep. Vote) 
Board Composition .811 Board Composition -.261 
Change (Percentage of (1.036) Change (Percentage of (1.689) 
Democrats Elected) Democrats Elected) 
Redistricting Year -.801* Redistricting Year -.449 
(4.873) (9.256) 
N 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .522 -.815 
F-Test 2.576 .351 
Note: Standard errors m parentheses; * p ::;.1, ** P ::;.05, ***p ::;.01 
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For McLean County especially, this model has the least explanatory power of any of the 
models put forth in this study, and is also not significant. However, this could be more 
indicative of a truth about the county level of government than it would appear. In other levels 
of government, one would expect measures like redistricting, the composition of a legislature, 
and the partisanship of the surrounding district to play a significant role in explaining 
incumbency advantage. Interestingly, only in the Champaign model did redistricting play a 
statistically significant role in explaining the movement in incumbency reelection rates. 
Furthermore, in Champaign County, redistricting did impact incumbency in the expected 
direction, since as time since redistricting increased, incumbent advantage decreased. The 
findings of this model, therefore support the second hypothesis, although the models achieved 
only mixed levels of significance. 
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The final model presented below follows a similar logic in terms of controls to that of the 
two preceding models. Here, however, average election margin of county board races serves as 
the dependent variable. This shuffling of variables attempts to test the different directionality of 
effects on various measures of redistricting effect in order to uncover the most useful way of 
examining these questions at this level of government. Cycling dependent variables in this way 
allows for more discovery of what measures function best as controls or capture variation the 
most. Average Election Margin for county board races depicts the level of safety that victors 
experience in the election, along with the general competitive nature of the county. This would 
estimate redistricting effects on the general competitiveness of the county board races which 
would potentially be linked to each county boards' composition in the long run. 
Table 4: County Board Redistricting and Board Race Competitiveness Measures, 1982-2009 
Dependent Variable: Average County Board Election Margin (Republican Percentage of Two-Party Vote) 
Champaign County McLean County 
Independent Variable Average Margin Independent Variable Average Margin 
Constant 37.623 Constant 124.039 
(7.699) (34.778) 
State Presidential Margin -.638 State Presidential 3.070 
(.455) Margin (1.042) 
State Gubernatorial -.471 State Gubernatorial -.322 
Margin (.097) Margin (.275) 
Champaign Presidential .340 McLean Presidential -2.618 
Margin (.449) Margin (.967) 
Champaign 1.167* McLean Gubernatorial -.223 
Gubernatorial Margin (.170) Margin (.363) 
Champaign Uncontested .789*** McLean Uncontested .153 
Races-Republican (.165) Races-Republican (.216) 
Champaign Uncontested -1.175** McLean Uncontested -.227 
Races- Democratic (.368) Races- Democratic (.326) 
Board Composition .384 Board Composition -.291 
Change (Percent (.165) Change (Percent (.300) 
Democrats Elected) Democrats Elected) 
Champaign Incumbents -.180 McLean Incumbents -.147 
Reelected (.078) Reelected (.090) 
Redistricting Year -.309 Redistricting Year -.294 
(.912) (1.676) 
N 14 14 
Adj. R-squared .917 .512 
F-Test 17.022*** 2.516 
Note: Standard errors In parentheses; * p ::;;.1, ** P ::;;.05, ***p ::;;.01 
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The significance of the Champaign County model with average margin as the dependent 
variable causes it to stand out from among other models in the study. Problematically, most of 
this significance and explanatory power could come from the uncontested seats variables, 
which are among the only independent variables also significant in this model. This suggests 
that collinearity may also have occurred, discrediting the model. For example, in Champaign 
County, these variables most likely move together with the average margin of victory because 
there are fewer contested seats, so they pull the average more severely and the movement is 
thus more significant. The logic behind retaining the uncontested seat variables, however, was 
an attempt to control for local effects, wherein a board member may remain unchallenged for 
years because of his or her high name recognition in the community. Alternatively, in McLean 
County, even these measures do not have a significant correlation with the dependent variable. 
In addition to the uncontested races variables, the Champaign County gubernatorial margin 
achieves significance in this model, though the opposite is true for McLean County. The most 
plausible explanation here comes from Champaign's more competitive county make-up, which 
causes it to move more in line with the pattern of the state. 
In this model, redistricting does not have a significant correlation with Republican 
electoral strength. Again, this insignificance possibly results from the small number of cases 
available here. Theoretically, with a larger number of cases, if a negative correlation were 
sustained, it would suggest that as time passes after a redistricting, the gap between Republican 
and Democratic electoral strength shrinks. In some ways, this could be opposed to the 
hypothesis that redistricting will directly impact board composition by altering the status quo of 
electoral districts, potentially improving prospects for change. On the other hand, redistricting 
could strengthen the majority party, causing its electoral strength to increase most when the 
time lag since redistricting is at its least, so this negative correlation could also have some 
theoretical justification. 
With models that have so little statistical strength due to their small number of cases, the 
overall picture of these findings may be more important than the predictive success of the 
individual variables. The fact that greater explanatory power and more instances of significance 
occurred in Champaign County models than in McLean County models provides insight into 
redistricting theory on a broader level. McLean County's board has been demonstrated by 
Hypothesis 1 and Table 1 to be the much less competitive body. Interestingly, it shows less 
overall tendency to fit the basic tenants of redistricting theory in political science literature, such 
as expected redistricting effects on incumbency, electoral safety, and board composition. 
Perhaps redistricting's impact only arises in a more partisan political culture, where electoral 
competition provides more of an impetus in the redistricting process. Champaign County's 
models' comparatively high levels of explanatory value in some ways confirm the expectation 
that McLean County's redistricting issues are much less centered on partisan lines. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In spite of statistical significance issues that followed from the data's limited number of 
cases, the findings presented in this study fill a gap in the existing literature. Although an 
increased number of cases could provide more conclusive statistical evidence, the expectations 
of increased partisan strength in county board decision-making in McLean County have thus 
far failed to surface. The findings of this study are exploratory and suggest possible patterns in 
electoral politics of county redistricting and board members' decision making. For example, the 
number of roll call votes taken by the county board decreases dramatically within the sample 
time frame from 1982-2009. As the board increased its reliance on committee structure in 
government, its partisanship may not surface in roll call voting as reliably as in previous years. 
The discussion of voting cleavages within the McLean County Board would therefore 
necessitate further examination, although in general it would seem that increasing partisan 
competition has the most correlation with the cohesion of the Republican group of board 
members, and the urban-rural group cohesion patterns do not seem to vary in a specific 
direction over time. A final note on this segment of the study draws attention also to the 
significant bivariate correlation between board composition change and Democratic voting 
cohesion, which again may indicate that future increases partisan competition could continue to 
impact the strength of party as a mechanism for the formation of voting blocs on the county 
board. Because of Republican model strength and the seemingly contradictory picture of 
continuing urban-rural group cohesion, I also find it likely that the impact of partisan influence 
in McLean County may be increasing, but just as in the case of Southern realignment, may not 
yet be fully iterated in the legislative body of the county board. 
The models comparing the impact of partisan competition on redistricting trends 
suggest that a more competitive partisan county government follows trends of electoral politics 
and redistricting more closely than a less partisan body. However, the redistricting process 
itself has minimal discernible impact in both communities, at least in terms of measurement 
used in this model. Although results were mixed within the models, the McLean County data's 
lack of significance in the relationships between standard measures of electoral competition and 
board composition, incumbency, and member security all suggest that units of government 
with strong two-party competition have more consistent patterns of electoral behavior. This 
broad finding may assist public administrators and managers in understanding the principles 
behind different redistricting schemes. 
A more detailed look at redistricting impact or a comparison of redistricting processes 
from county to county could be valuable additions to future research. For instance, covering a 
broader range of counties would assist in minimizing the small N issues with the model and 
would add greater confidence to the findings of this exploratory study. Furthermore, measuring 
redistricting only in terms of time lapsed since the last redistricting process most likely limits 
the measure of the impact of this variable. One useful addition would be a measure that 
included the impact of the redistricting on different districts and their partisan makeup. This 
would require an in-depth examination of individual counties' redistricting processes year by 
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year. Again, the impact of having this improved measure would help scholars isolate the impact 
of redistricting at the county level. 
Other measures could generate more explanatory power about the workings of partisan 
competition within county boards themselves. For instance, including committee votes and 
action would be relevant in a situation with more cases. Analyzing the use of party as a 
decision-making mechanism for board members through a content analysis of divisions on 
issues at board meetings could also be insightful. One additional possibility for measuring the 
strength of local party organizations would be the percentage of precinct committeemen chairs 
filled by parties. 
This study strengthens the framework of the literature, applying it to a new level of 
government with the suggestion that bodies that are traditionally less partisan experience less 
well-defined impact of redistricting and national party -strength trends. In linking the study to 
the literature, Broach's ideas of institutional reinforcement of non-partisan divides parallel the 
research of this study.20 Interestingly, the conclusions from these models also bolster his claim 
that redistricting effects apply more clearly in two-party systems than elsewhere. Even in the 
face of insignificant findings, this exploratory study has attempted to lay the groundwork for a 
fresh method of applying party development, competition, and redistricting theory to 
America's 1/ dark continent." County government directly impacts the lives of citizens in 
tangible ways. The role of electoral competition in its operations, although it varies from county 
to county, is important for developing an understanding of politics in the most neglected level 
of government. 
20 Broach 1972. 
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